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DRONE STRIKES:  A REMOTE FORM OF SELF-DEFENCE? 
 
Nigel D White and Lydia Davies-Bright 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
A Motyxia Sequoiae millipede glows with bioluminescence in order to warn off predators. 
Should it be faced with an imminent threat, it secretes a toxic mix of cyanide and chemicals in 
order to stave off a potentially fatal attack.1 This capacity of the organism to defend itself is 
arguably one of the most basic and fundamental natural instincts – the desire to live and the 
ability to survive an external attack will ensure the continuance of the life form. If an organism 
capitulates in the face of external danger, it will soon be subsumed by others and be but a mere 
speck in the history of life on this planet. Thus, it could be said that every organism has the 
right to defend itself from external attack as to deny it the capacity to do so, is to condemn it to 
death and annihilation. 
 
The right of the individual person to defend themselves against an imminent attack is 
recognised in law.2 Similarly, a state, as an international legal person, has an ‘inherent’ right to 
defend itself.3 As with the Motyxia Sequoiae, a state may passively warn would-be attackers 
that it is dangerous, for example, by having a well-equipped military. However, in the event of 
an imminent threat, a state will also launch appropriate counter-measures. This right to self-
defence against ‘unjust’ attack was described in 1758 by Emmerich de Vattel as ‘not only the 
right that every Nation has, but it is a duty, and one of its most sacred duties’.4 It follows that 
                                                          
1 C Arnold, ‘New Glowing Millipede Found; Shows How Bioluminescence Evolved’ (National Geographic, 4 
May 2015) <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/05/150504-glowing-millipedes-evolution-insects-
animals-california/> accessed 13 April 2016; CQ Choi, ‘Strange Glowing Millipedes Ooze Cyanide to Foil 
Predators’ (Live Science, 26 September 2011) <www.livescience.com/16221-glowing-millipedes-toxic-
warning.html> accessed 13 April 2016. 
2 Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) s3(1) ‘A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the 
prevention of crime’; D Ormerod and K Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (OUP 2015) 427. 
3 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UNC) art 51. 
4 E de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of 
Nations and of Sovereigns (trans T Nugent, Liberty 2008) 246. 
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states have a duty to protect those who belong to it, which is part of the basic agreement 
underlying social and legal structures.5 A state cannot be sovereign, independent, or expect to 
continue to exist if it does not have the right to defend itself and its citizens from aggression 
emanating from an external party: if a state cannot protect its citizens from ‘the subjection of a 
foreign power’, then it has breached the social contract and so can no longer exercise a 
monopoly over the use of coercive force.6 
 
This chapter addresses the concept of self-defence through an analysis of a drone strike 
conducted by the UK government in August 2015 against an individual British citizen residing 
in ISIL-held territory within Syria. In this case, self-defence is posited in a way that reveals a 
new reliance on an old understanding of self-defence, based on self-defence as sovereignty and 
less as a distinct and confined rule of the jus ad bellum. In a way, although individual terrorists 
cannot normally be seen as an existential threat to a state, their antipathy towards the status quo 
has the potential to erode the system of sovereign states, by challenging their continuation, but 
also by provoking increasingly draconian responses by states that will potentially destroy them 
from within.  
 
The chapter examines the contribution of technology to legal change, but concludes that 
technology is also contributing to changes to the overall structure of international relations by 
facilitating the breakdown in sovereignty by its persistent erosion of borders, provoking, in 
response, desperate efforts to shore it up by returning to primordial understandings of 
sovereignty based on preservation of the nation state. Technology has speeded up the escalating 
and apparently never-ending cycle of blows and counter-blows7 and means that individual 
terrorists can orchestrate attacks on states from afar as well as being targeted by remotely 
                                                          
5 A fact explicitly acknowledged by national leaders, especially when justifying a use of force and framing it as 
being in defence of the nation, eg Prime Minister David Cameron speaking to the House of Commons, ‘My first 
duty as a Prime Minister is to keep the British people safe.’ HC Deb 7 September 2015, col 27 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150907/debtext/150907-0001.htm> accessed 13 
April 2016; UK Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon MP in his oral evidence to the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights asserting that preventing loss of life is the ‘primary duty of government’, Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, Oral Evidence: The UK Government’s Policy on Use of Drones for Targeted Killing (HC 2015–
16, 574) 7 <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-rights-
committee/the-uk-governments-policy-on-the-use-of-drones-for-targeted-killing/oral/27633.pdf> accessed 13 
April 2016. 
6 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government. In the Former, the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, 
and his Followers, are Detected and Overthrown: the Latter, is an Essay Concerning the Original, Extent, and 
End, of Civil Government (prepared by R Hay for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic 
Thought, Thomas Tegg, W Sharpe and Son 1823) 200 para 217 
<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf> accessed 13 April 2016. 
7 TJ Farer, ‘Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium?’ (2002) 96 AJIL 359. 
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operated drones, but the return to absolute forms of sovereignty by technologically advanced 
states is something more profound and alarming. The reversion to ancient notions of 
sovereignty is in contrast to progress in technology. 
 
II. Self-Defence and the Social Contract 
The frequent targeted strikes by drones on an individual (suspected) terrorists demonstrate the 
modern phenomenon of ‘legally saturated violence’,8 namely that international relations is now 
characterised by multiple, every-day uses of force by states that are not simply cynically 
justified in legal terms, but are seen as the exercise of the essence of sovereignty as states seek 
to defend themselves and their citizens from violence emanating from other states, so-called 
states (eg Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL), non-state armed groups and individual 
terrorists. In the current debate about drone usage, law is not peripheral to the exercise of state 
power but is at the heart of it, a return, in a way, to the basic social contract at the heart of a 
state – to provide security in return for its monopoly on the use of force. However, the 
monopoly of the state over force cannot take away an individual’s right to self-defence. In 
Western legal traditions, an individual is permitted to defend their self and also others as an 
extension of this right.9 Aggression by an external actor compromises an individual’s freedom, 
who is then entitled to ‘vindicate [their] freedom by repelling the aggressor’.10 
 
The endemic global violence unleashed after 9/11 in 2001 has generated numerous 
explanations under the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but increasingly also by a ‘meta’ concept 
of ‘self-defence’ that has hitherto largely been confined to the jus ad bellum, and now seems 
to have been unchained from its shackles in Article 51 of the UN Charter to become the 
overriding norm. Its apparent transformation from a right that justified the defence of one state 
from an attack by another, to an overweening inherent exercise of sovereign duty to protect all 
aspects of a state (its territory, its government and its population, even its way of life11) has had 
                                                          
8 A-C Martineau, ‘Concerning Violence: A Post-Colonial Reading of the Debate on the Use of Force’ (2016) 29 
LJIL 95, 112. 
9 GP Fletcher and JD Ohlin, Defending Humanity (OUP 2008) 51. 
10 ibid 48. 
11 See, eg the statement by President Hollande following the terrorist attacks Paris on 13 November 2015 declaring 
that the attacks were ‘committed by a terrorist army, the Islamic State group, a jihadist army, against France, 
against the values we defend everywhere in the world, against what we are: a free country that means something 
to the whole planet… What we are defending is our country, but more than that, it is our values’. L Dearden, 
‘Paris terror attack: Francois Hollande vows merciless response to Isis “barbarity”’ The Independent (London, 14 
November 2015). 
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a profound effect on the conduct of international relations, facilitated by advances in 
technology and the securitisation of many aspects of everyday life.  
 
The advent of ‘human security’, broadly defined as a freedom from want and a freedom from 
fear, was promoted as a value to balance against the narrow state-centric focus of ‘security of 
territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests’.12 However, the 
attempt to focus security concerns on the micro level – on the lives of ordinary people – has 
now been merged with ‘state security’ to justify the return to a focus on the macro level by 
framing uses of force as being against targets that present a general threat to a state’s citizens 
and their daily lives. The reconceptualising of security as people-centric, ‘a concern with 
human life and dignity’ rather than with weapons,13 has been accepted by politicians and 
commentators and also, perhaps, by history. The world is not currently locked in an ideological 
battle for global dominance manifested in a nuclear arms race, the Cold War has been won by 
the West. Accordingly, the current threat is also framed as being centred on people – the enemy 
is not a state, it is people who seek to destroy the every-day lives of ordinary people.14 Thus, 
the requisite response, the self-defence to this threat, is also people centred. 
 
Self-defence has an instinctive, almost visceral quality to it and, when contemplated, the 
question asked is often not if violence in the face of danger is acceptable, but rather how far is 
a person or state permitted to go when repelling an apparent threat. For Grotius, defence is one 
of the ‘just’ causes of war and lies at the heart of sovereign statehood.15 Similarly, many 
philosophers have connected the nature of the state with self-defence. John Locke viewed 
protection as being the core justification for the state’s monopoly on the use of force. In order 
to preserve their wealth, life, liberty and general well-being, men united together to form states 
and made a pact (the social contract) with government that it would have coercive power, in 
exchange for protection. It follows that, if the government becomes unable to protect the people 
against threats, the people are justified in throwing over the government as the pact has been 
broken – the people have returned to the state of nature.16 
 
                                                          
12 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (OUP 1994) (HDR 1994) 22 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf> accessed 10 April 2016. 
13 HDR 1994 (n 12) 22. 
14 The HDR 1994 (n 12) includes terrorism as being a security threat that concerns ordinary people, 22. 
15 ‘Hugo Grotius’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 28 July 2011) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/#JusWarDoc> accessed 13 April 2016. 
16 Locke (n 6). 
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By legitimising the use of force through citing self-defence, governments are able to maintain 
their position and the status quo – the people accept the use of force as the government is 
fulfilling its duty. Indeed, as mentioned above, this duty is often cited by politicians when 
justifying a particular incident of force.17 Thus, the continuance of the current situation relies 
on a threat that people need protecting from and the ability of the state to provide that 
protection. Hobbes conceptualised a social order in which people join together in a social 
covenant that provides them security from an external threat.18 Their motivation is to escape 
the state of nature in which they live in perpetual fear and under continual threat and so they 
agree to form communities, common laws and mechanisms to keep and enforce the laws. 
Although Hobbes argued that the sovereign had to be given absolute authority in order to ensure 
the preservation of society, he permitted the people to disobey the sovereign in the event that 
it failed to provide adequate protection.19 Again, the legitimacy of the sovereign is connected 
to its ability to sufficiently safe-guard its people. 
 
Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau also conceived of a social pact in which people agree to form 
a collective and to accept restrictions on their individual liberties in order to receive the benefits 
of state protection. The sovereign is committed to the good of the individuals that constitute it 
and each individual is committed to the good of the whole.20 On this conception, the idea that 
an individual may break ‘the contract’ and so be denied membership to the collective21 has at 
least an appearance of validity. An individual does not have the liberty to decide whether or 
not they wish to fulfil their duties to the sovereign power and collective, whilst still receiving 
the benefits of citizenship. However, the sovereign power has the monopoly on power in order 
to maintain order and to ensure compliance with the agreed rules. Expelling every individual 
who dissented would restrict and limit the form of direct democracy that Rousseau espoused 
and so is arguably not in keeping with his philosophy. 
 
                                                          
17 Eg Prime Minister David Cameron (n 5). 
18 T Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill 
(prepared by R Hay for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought, Andrew Crooke 
1651) 106 <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf> accessed 13 April 2016. 
19 ‘The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth 
by which he is able to protect them.’ Hobbes (n 18) 136. 
20 J-J Rousseau, The Social Contract (trans M Cranston, Penguin 2004). 
21 A Nossiter, ‘French Proposal to Strip Citizenship over Terrorism Sets off Alarms’ The New York Times (New 
York, 8 January 2016): Prime Minister Manuel Valls ‘insisted in a television interview… that “you are French 
because you adhere to a community. This strict measure applies to terrorists who have been convicted of especially 
grave crimes, and it is because they have broken the contract… it is a way of consolidating the national pact.”’ 
6 
To legitimately evoke the right to self-defence, a state is required to demonstrate that it has 
suffered an intentional armed attack.22 Traditionally, this was understood as being an attack on 
the territory or flagged ship of a state. In the modern era, it is not necessarily so straightforward 
to determine when an armed attack has begun and so when it is legitimate to utilise armed force 
in self-defence. In the aftermath of 9/11, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368 
and made explicit reference to ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter’. Resolution 1373 reaffirmed this statement and, utilising Chapter 
VII powers, adopted a series of binding decisions, which included an instruction for all states 
to ‘take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist attacks’. These resolutions 
designated terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and recognised or, indeed, 
helped to create conditions in which states would be able to exercise their inherent right to self-
defence in response to terrorism or even the threat of terrorism. Thus, in this age of terrorism, 
NSAs are deemed capable of mounting an armed attack that justifies and legitimises the use of 
force in self-defence. This developing of the principle of self-defence in extremis, without 
providing criteria for determining whether an act by an NSA is an ‘armed attack’ (and so a 
threat to international peace and security) and without thought to the consequences, has 
arguably undermined the prohibition on the use of armed force as now states are able to 
designate a fellow state or an NSA as terrorist and thereby justify the use of force by citing 
self-defence. For example, in response to the 2015 Paris shootings, France embarked upon an 
aerial bombing campaign against ISIL in Syria, citing self-defence, despite the lack of credible 
evidence that the shootings were carried out by ISIL operatives and/or explicitly co-ordinated 
and directed by the group and so actually attributable to them.23 It appears that it is enough for 
an act of violence to be ‘inspired by’ ISIL for it to justify the use of force in self-defence.24 
                                                          
22 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Judgment) [2003] ICJ 
Rep 161, 187 para 51: ‘Therefore, in order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms 
in exercise of the right of individual self-defence, the United States has to show that attacks had been made upon 
it for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” 
within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and as understood in customary 
law on the use of force.’ 
23 BBC News, ‘Paris Attacks: Who were the attackers?’, 8 March 2016, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34832512, accessed 18 April 2016. See generally K Tibori-Szabo, 
‘Self-Defence and the United States Policy on Drone Strikes’ (2015) 20 JCSL 381, 401. 
24 See, eg Prime Minister David Cameron, during the Parliamentary debate on Syrian airstrikes, claiming that the 
UK Security Services have foiled seven plots against the UK that were ‘inspired by’ the radical teachings of the 
‘death cult’ that is ISIL in order to justify his claim that ISIL poses a credible threat and so Britain should join the 
airstrikes campaign. It has since emerged that there is no actual evidence of a direct link between the plots and 
ISIL. Thus, it appears that merely the existence of ISIL and its ideology poses a threat to international peace and 
security and so engages the inherent right to self-defence (and self-preservation – the Western states are arguably 
fighting to maintain the status quo and to preserve their existence as it is now): ‘They have inspired the worst 
terrorist attack against British people since 7/7 on the beaches of Tunisia, and they have plotted atrocities on the 
streets here at home. Since November last year our security services have foiled no fewer than seven different 
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III. Drone Technology and Legal Change  
With the odd exception, such as the regulation of outer space,25 international law tends to 
develop as a reaction to change. In this way it might be anticipated that new non-kinetic 
technologies that can be used to disable computer networks, or to carry mass covert 
surveillance of e-mail traffic, may take decades to bring within a clear legal framework, 
depending on how quickly states come to realise that it is in their mutual self-interest to 
effectively regulate cyber-space. It may, in any case, prove to be an impossible task as it raises 
the question of whether states can actually regulate something that has escaped the confines of 
sovereignty – it may simply be too late to put the genie back into the bottle. In this scenario, 
states will fall back on general principles of international law, such as the norm prohibiting 
intervention in a state’s political or economic affairs, which will not prevent cyber operations 
but will enable selective condemnation in the General Assembly and, occasionally, executive 
responses to particular threats by the Security Council. 
 
In contrast, when it comes to new technologies that seem to provide straightforward 
improvements in military efficacy, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly 
known as drones, it should be expected that existing international law will be adequate. Indeed, 
this is quite commonly the argument made in the literature, given that drones are seen as mere 
‘platforms’ for the launch of weapons such as missiles and not new weapons per se.26 
Furthermore, drones are portrayed by their users and supporters as upholding the value of 
security rather than undermining it.27 Drone using states, in particular, argue that new law is 
unnecessary for the regulation of drones, since they are simply another means of delivering 
death and destruction. But such arguments belie the fact that existing laws have to be 
reinterpreted and applied to drones and that in this process the louder voices of the drone using 
state tends to dominate. Such debate is not confined to the rules of humanitarian law on 
                                                          
plots against our people, so this threat is very real… do we go after these terrorists in their heartlands, from where 
they are plotting to kill British people, or do we sit back and wait for them to attack us?’ HC Deb 2 December 
2015, col 324 <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151202/debtext/151202-0001.htm> 
accessed 14 April 2016. 
25 See UNGA Res 1962 ‘Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space’ (13 December 1963) UN Doc A/RES/1962 (XVIII); Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(adopted 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205. 
26 D Turns, ‘Droning on: Some International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
in Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, in C Harvey, J Summers and ND White (eds), Contemporary Challenges to 
the Laws of War (CUP 2014) 199. 
27 For critical evaluation, see C Gray, ‘Targeted Killings: Recent US Attempts Obama to Create a Legal 
Framework’ (2013) Current Legal Problems 1.  
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targeting,28 but also include the rules of the use of lethal forced found in human rights law (in 
the context of the right to life) and, moreover, the application of the right of self-defence both 
within the meaning of Article 51 and under human rights law. The essence of self-defence is 
action necessary to ensure the survival of a state or person under threat of imminent attack. 
Given that the drones themselves are not entitled to the right of self-defence since their 
operators are not under imminent threat of attack, and the targets are a distance away from the 
state using them, the dynamics of self-defence action though the use of drones are clearly 
different.  
 
The increasing use of drones raises security concerns for a number of reasons. When they are 
used for surveillance they are potential threats to personal security and privacy. When used for 
targeting purposes they not only raise security concerns for civilians potentially caught in the 
blast (the problem of collateral losses), but they also seem to either extend the battlefield, 
thereby bringing the instability inherent in war, or constitute the extraterritorial application of 
force for the purposes of some extreme form of law enforcement. Under this model of law 
enforcement, capture, arrest and trial are replaced by summary execution. All of these 
conceptions of drone use challenge the notion that they represent a new era of clean, clinical 
and, above all, legitimate use of force. Perceptions and assertions of security by governments 
are difficult for the courts to resist, particularly in times of terrorism that are characterised by 
random attacks against civilians, even when government actions to protect the lives and 
security of its citizens may appear to tread on the very freedoms it is fighting to protect. 
 
Governments are under a duty to provide their citizens with security, but it cannot be an 
absolute duty – one that it aims to achieve at all costs. Due diligence obligations upon 
governments are obligations of conduct,29 rather than result, and so a failure by government to 
prevent specific acts of terrorism is not necessarily an indication that the state has failed to 
fulfil its duties to protect life and security. The random nature of many terrorist actions means 
that it is very difficult to prevent each and every one. When considering how these obligations 
have been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee in the context of the rights to life and 
security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,30 it is clear that states 
                                                          
28 WH Boothby, The Law of Targeting (OUP 2012) 593. 
29 S Marks and F Azizi, ‘Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights Obligations: International Mechanism’ 
in J Crawford, A Pellet and S Olleson (eds), The Law of State Responsibility (OUP 2010) 729. 
30 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) arts 6 and 9. 
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must take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect individuals within their jurisdiction 
who are subject to known threats to their lives.31 The European Court of Human Rights has 
similar jurisprudence, stating in one judgment that a government that ‘knew or ought to have 
known… of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from 
the criminal acts of a third party’, must take ‘measures within the scope of their powers, which, 
judged reasonably, might’ be ‘expected to avoid that risk’.32 As has been stated by Bates: 
 
Applying this jurisprudence by analogy to terrorist attacks creates some challenges: the 
bombing of civilians on aircraft or commuter trains and the hijacking of aircraft suggests 
a random choice of victims, rather than the selection of an ‘identified individual or 
individuals’ as victims.33 
 
When drones are used outside of a state’s jurisdiction, whether for surveillance or for targeting 
purposes, and when lethal force is used against individuals, the human rights issues become 
more complex. While human rights obligations apply to individuals within a state’s territory, 
there is considerable debate about when they apply to individuals outside its territory but, 
arguably, within its jurisdiction.34 When considering the use of armed force from a drone 
against a terrorist suspect, the question is whether the individual is within the jurisdiction of 
the state using force. Although there is some Inter-American case-law that supports the 
application of the right to life in these circumstances,35 there is contrary European 
jurisprudence.36 Rather than considering whether the state using force has enough control over 
the targeted individual for the purposes of evaluating whether there is an assertion of 
jurisdiction in these circumstances, it might be better for the Courts to focus on the fact that the 
operator of the drone, often a distance away from the target, is clearly under the control of the 
state using force.37 
 
                                                          
31 Delgado Paez v Columbia (12 July 1990) Human Rights Committee Communication No 195/1985, para 5.5. 
32 Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245. 
33 ES Bates, Terrorism and International Law: Accountability, Remedies and Reform (OUP 2011) 83–4. 
34 See generally M Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’ 
(2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 81, 111ff.  
35 Armando Alejandre Jr, Carlos Costa, Mario de la Pena and Pablo Morales v Cuba (Brothers to the Rescue), 
Case 11.589, Report No 86/99 (28 September 1999) para 25. 
36 Bankovic and others v 17 NATO States Admissibility Decision (Grand Chamber) App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 
12 December 2001) paras 52–3. 
37 F Hampson, ‘The Scope of the Extra-Territorial Applicability of International Human Rights Law’ in G Gilbert, 
F Hampson and C Sandoval (eds), The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Sir Nigel Rodley 
(Routledge 2011) 181–2.  
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If jurisdiction is established, such uses of targeted force from drones, when taken outside of 
armed conflict, appear to be violations of the right to life as there is usually no imminent threat 
to the state to justify its use of force as a last resort.38 Indeed, the use of lethal force from drones 
seems to be an extreme and unlawful version of law enforcement where it is easier to kill 
suspects than to capture them (particularly as capturing suspects would put them within the 
capturing state’s jurisdiction).39 Furthermore, the use of drones for targeting suspected 
terrorists appears to be an attempt to externalise a state’s security measures to counter terrorism 
by taking out targets in another state’s territory before they have chance to hit the drone state’s 
territory or nationals. The US has tried to justify this by arguing what is the ultimate 
justification for using lethal force – that there is a global armed conflict against terrorists or, at 
the very least, a transnational armed conflict against Al Qaeda and its associates. This argument 
is an attempt to justify a lower standard for the use of lethal force for, in simple terms, a use of 
lethal force is allowed in an armed conflict if the target is either a military objective, a 
combatant, or a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities, and the anticipated collateral 
damage (‘incidental loss of civilian life’) is not excessive in relation to the expected military 
advantage.40 The US has interpreted these rules liberally: to carry out ‘signature’ strikes on the 
basis that the targeted individual is performing suspicious activities; to target funerals where 
there is a concentration of Taliban leaders; to target drug lords (who are criminals not 
combatants); and sometimes to order strikes outside of a conflict-zone, for example, in Yemen 
in 2002 and again in 2011.41 Under President Obama the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric has been 
abandoned in favour of a mixture of jus ad bellum and in bello justifications according to which 
a targeted killing is lawful ‘if the targeted individual posed an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the USA, capture was not feasible, and the operation was conducted in line with law of 
war principles’,42 with a presumption that a known terrorist located anywhere in the world 
constitutes an imminent threat to the US and its citizens.43 Rather than determining whether 
that individual is a specific imminent threat (i.e. is about to launch an attack), their membership 
of a group such as Al Qaeda or ISIL is sufficient per se. In this way jus in bello reasoning in 
the form of identification of a ‘combatant’ is used to justify triggering a right of self-defence 
                                                          
38 UNHRC ‘P Alston: ‘Study on Targeted Killings, Report to the Human Rights Council’ (2010) UN Doc 
A/HRC/14.24/Add.6, paras 85–6. 
39 Ocalan v Turkey App No 46221/99 (ECtHR, 12 March 2003) para 125. 
40 Article 55, Additional Protocol I 1977; Turns (n 26) 207. 
41 S Casey-Maslen, ‘The Use of Armed Drones, in S Casey-Maslen (ed), Weapons under International Human 
Rights Law (CUP 2014) 400–3. 
42 Tibori-Szabo (n 23) 383. 
43 ibid 402. 
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under the jus ad bellum. The confusion of legal concepts is a deliberate manipulation of the 
law to justify drones, which are used to hunt down their targets rather than respond to imminent 
attacks. 
 
It seems that after the devastating attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, governments (and 
not just the US) have re-assessed their security priorities, have reasserted national security 
(often on the basis that this is the best way to protect human security) and have acted in 
violation of basic norms governing when coercion can be used by the state against individuals 
in order to protect the majority of its citizens. This has either been as a result of the extension 
of the battlefield or the extension of law enforcement. While the majority of states may support 
this, or, more accurately, remain supine in the face of these erosions, the securitisation of post-
9/11 life has meant that (the right to) security has been elevated to a pre-eminent position in 
political rhetoric and action in contradistinction to its position as one of a number of human 
rights and protections provided by international law.44 
 
Thus, while there are international norms applicable to drone use, a great deal of it is 
underdeveloped, indeterminate or ineffectual, and furthermore, has been subject to artful 
manipulation of the boundaries between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, with little regard to 
the right to life of the target. The UN itself has not tackled the legality of drone usage in any 
meaningful way. Although this is probably to be expected in the executive body, it is 
disappointing to see that the plenary body has also failed to fulfil its functions as a security 
community with the ability to shape normative frameworks, confining itself instead to 
exhortation in general resolutions to the effect that counter-terrorism efforts by states should 
be undertaken in conformity with international human rights law, refugee law and international 
humanitarian law.45 This simply begs the question of how these norms should be applied to 
drone strikes. 
 
IV. The Killing of an Individual in Self-Defence of a State  
Given the discussion above, it seems that technology may have outstripped the law, for drones 
are not just new platforms for delivering weapons, they actually change the dynamics of both 
the battlefield and of law enforcement outside the battlefield. In the former, they enable the 
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enemy to be taken out without any risk to the drone-state’s soldiers. They change the idea of 
war from the clash of armies, towards asymmetrical warfare often characterised by a 
technologically rich state using force against a technologically poor state or non-state actor. 
While international humanitarian law seems to be more readily interpreted to allow the 
calculated killings of soldiers and other combatants, outside of that law enforcement generally 
requires that the state (thorough its police or other agents) acts out of self-defence or defence 
of others, sometimes also when absolutely necessary in attempting to carry out arrests or quell 
riots.46 The UN Declaration on the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials 1990 stated: 
 
9. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to 
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to 
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his 
or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these 
objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when 
strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.47 
 
It is to the use of lethal force delivered by drones outside of armed conflict, and whether the 
above-stated standard is applicable, that this chapter now turns by focusing on one particular 
strike by a drone operated by the UK that resulted in the death of Reyaad Khan in Syria on 21 
August 2015. 
 
A. The Killing of Reyaad Khan 
In the House of Commons, Prime Minister David Cameron justified this action as one of self-
defence. He began by contextualising the UK’s action: 
 
Turning to our national security, I would like to update the House on action taken this 
summer to protect our country from a terrorist attack. With the rise of ISIL, we know 
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terrorist threats to our country are growing. In 2014, there were 15 ISIL-related attacks 
around the world. This year, there have already been 150 such attacks, including the 
appalling tragedies in Tunisia in which 31 Britons lost their lives. I can tell the House that 
our police and security services have stopped at least six different attempts to attack the 
UK in the past 12 months alone.48 
 
The Prime Minister provided no more detail on these alleged plots – not even an indication of 
the stage at which the plots were stopped or the nature of the attempted attacks. There is also 
no indication as to whether or not the plots were such that those involved faced (successful) 
criminal prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation, or whether the security services relied 
on more conventional criminal law provisions. The lack of detailed information is interesting 
as it allows the Prime Minister to build an image of a country under siege from terrorist attacks, 
without being restricted by or bogged-down in the details. He continued: 
 
The threat picture facing Britain in terms of Islamist extremist violence is more acute today 
than ever before. In stepping up our response to meet this threat, we have developed a 
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that seeks to prevent and disrupt plots against 
this country at every stage. It includes new powers to stop suspects travelling. It includes 
powers to enable our police and security services to apply for stronger locational constraints 
on those in the UK who pose a risk. It addresses the root cause of the threat—the poisonous 
ideology of Islamist extremism—by taking on all forms of extremism, not just violent 
extremism.49 
 
Here Mr Cameron continues in the construction of a UK facing an unprecedented threat (it has 
never before been as acute), which requires an even stronger response, by explaining a counter-
terrorist strategy that ultimately requires the extinction of threats at their source. The vagueness 
of his language here is concerning, especially when viewed in the light of the government’s 
over-broad definition of extremism in its Counter-Extremism Strategy,50 which is potentially 
capable of covering any form of opposition to the current status quo. The definition has 
simultaneously shifted and narrowed from its literal meaning of driving something to the limit, 
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to the extreme (or edge)51 to a term that indicates political and/or religious views that lie outside 
of the (acceptable) mainstream attitudes of a given society. Given that ‘Extremism is a 
relational concept’52 and ‘…the labelling of activities, people, and groups as “extremist”, and 
the defining of what is “ordinary” in any setting is always a subjective and political matter.’53 
For something to be considered ‘extreme’, there must be a mainstream against which it can be 
measured – extremism is now used to label views and opinions as ‘bad’ in an apparent attempt 
to create an objective standard to which all must  adhere. The Prime Minister continued by 
outlining the UK government’s response to the threat: 
 
We have pursued Islamist terrorists through the courts and the criminal justice system. 
Since 2010, more than 800 people have been arrested and 140 successfully prosecuted. Our 
approach includes acting overseas to tackle the threat at source, with British aircraft 
delivering nearly 300 air strikes over Iraq. Our airborne intelligence and surveillance assets 
have assisted our coalition partners with their operations over Syria. As part of this counter-
terrorism strategy, as I have said before, if there is a direct threat to the British people and 
we are able to stop it by taking immediate action, then, as Prime Minister, I will always be 
prepared to take that action. That is the case whether the threat is emanating from Libya, 
from Syria or from anywhere else.54 
 
The Prime Minister then turned to the targeted drone strike in question, explaining it as a 
precise use of lethal force taken under the UK inherent right to self-defence in order to eliminate 
the threat caused by the terrorist activities of the targeted individual: 
 
In recent weeks it has been reported that two ISIL fighters of British nationality, who had 
been plotting attacks against the UK and other countries, have been killed in air strikes. 
Both Junaid Hussain and Reyaad Khan were British nationals based in Syria and were 
involved in actively recruiting ISIL sympathisers and seeking to orchestrate specific and 
barbaric attacks against the west, including directing a number of planned terrorist attacks 
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right here in Britain, such as plots to attack high-profile public commemorations, including 
those taking place this summer.55 
 
Interestingly, the Prime Minister does not explain why the drone strike was still considered to 
be necessary in August when the commemorative events had already occurred without 
incident.56 Lethal force used too late is an illegal reprisal or punishment, not a form of self-
defence in the face of an imminent attack. Action taken too early because the pattern of 
behaviour suggested further attacks were being planned is illegal force taken pre-emptively in 
anticipation of a future attack.57 The Prime Minister’s justification comes close to an explicit 
recognition that this was a form of capital punishment:   
 
We should be under no illusion; their intention was the murder of British citizens, so on 
this occasion we ourselves took action.58  
 
Here Prime Minister Cameron asserts knowledge of Reyaad Khan’s intention regarding British 
citizens. It is not clear how he came to be able to state this so emphatically and with such 
certainty, especially given that Reyaad Khan was not interviewed by any security agency or 
asked about his intentions directly. This statement is more a rhetorical device encouraging the 
listener to accept Khan as a particularly dangerous threat that necessitated a response from the 
UK government than a statement of fact. 
 
The justifications for lethal uses of force in self-defence often involve mentioning the 
illegitimacy of the victim due to their perceived wrongdoing.59 This approach links the act of 
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self-defence with the concept of punishment and promotes the concept that some states are in 
a position to discipline individuals in other states. However, the ‘purpose of a defensive act is 
not to inflict harm according to the desert of the aggressor; its purpose is to repeal the attack’.60 
Thus, self-defence needs to be just that – the defence of the self. 
 
B. Killing an Individual as an Act of Self-Defence of the UK 
The Prime Minister relayed to the House the circumstances of Reyaad Khan’s death: 
 
Today, I can inform the House that in an act of self-defence and after meticulous planning, 
Reyaad Khan was killed in a precision airstrike carried out on 21 August by an RAF 
remotely piloted aircraft while he was travelling in a vehicle in the area of Raqqa in Syria. 
In addition to Reyaad Khan, who was the target of the strike, two ISIL associates were also 
killed, one of whom, Ruhul Amin, has been identified as a UK national. They were ISIL 
fighters, and I can confirm that there were no civilian casualties.61 
 
In this statement Mr Cameron unequivocally asserts that the UK was acting in self-defence. 
For a state to be able to assert its inherent right to self-defence under the jus ad bellum against 
Reyaad Khan, there needs to be an ‘armed attack’.62 In the Nicaragua case of 1986 the 
International Court of Justice stated that not every use of force would amount to an armed 
attack justifying the use of serious retaliatory force.63 A substantial imminent attack by ISIL 
may well meet the threshold of ‘scale and effects’ specified by the Court.64 However, the Prime 
Minister is asserting the right to self-defence against an individual. Given that the only 
information regarding potential targets was in relation to events that had already passed at the 
time of the airstrike and, in the absence of any details regarding what exactly Khan was 
planning, it is hard to see how an individual would be able to remotely launch an armed attack 
in a jus ad bellum sense.65 
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The point is that self-defence, by itself, is not a sufficient justification, especially when 
considering a use of force by a state against a specific individual. While not confining self-
defence at the international jus ad bellum level to force used against an attacking state, the 
attacker must still represent an imminent threat to the state, as per the scale and effects test in 
the Nicaragua case. The attacks of 9/11 conducted by a non-state actor, or imminent attacks of 
a similar nature, may cross the threshold of such an attack justifying self-defence under Article 
51 of the Charter, but care must be taken that the imminent threat posed by one individual is of 
sufficient gravity to trigger the Article 51 right, and if not, the standard must be a the more 
precise one as to when life can be taken under human rights law, where lethal force can only 
be used when absolutely necessary to defend oneself or others under imminent threat, unless 
the state using force is engaged in an armed conflict under which there are more generous rules 
on the use of lethal force.66 The UK was not engaged in an armed conflict in Syria at the time 
of Reyaad Khan’s killing in August 2015 and so the law of armed conflict was not applicable. 
It was not until December 2015 that the House of Commons approved of airstrikes in Syria.67 
 
C. Self-Defence as a Legal Principle 
That states have the right to self-defence is undisputed, what is potentially problematic here is 
the proposition that states have the right to self-defence under the jus ad bellum against an 
individual person outside of their territory. The importance to a government of being able to 
bring a use of force under the self-defence banner is that it renders a potentially wrongful act 
lawful and legitimate. Article 21 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility 2001 provides that: ‘The wrongfulness of an act of a state is precluded if the act 
constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations’. The government seems to be deliberately conflating the right of individual self-
defence a state has under the UN Charter and customary law, with the right that individuals 
have to defend themselves when attacked. Essentially these are separate rights exercised within 
different legal orders (international law and domestic criminal law), although international 
human rights law also recognises the right of individuals to self-defence in delineating the right 
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to life. The human rights standard is applicable to state agents when they use force to defend 
themselves or others, or to prevent a serious crime from being committed.   
 
i. In criminal law 
In UK domestic law, self-defence is the use of reasonable force in defence of the self, another 
person, or property. Imminence of threat is a necessary element.68 UK domestic criminal law 
generally does not apply extraterritorially, although for certain serious crimes it does – those 
offences include murder and manslaughter.69 
 
ii. In human rights law  
The UK did not have control or authority over the area in which Khan resided. According to 
the European Court of Human Rights, for human rights to have extra-territorial application, the 
state in question must be exercising control and authority over the relevant individual and/or 
the territory in which they are in.70 As the UK was not involved in military action in Syria at 
that time, this was prima facia not the case and so the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) would not appear to apply. If the ECHR were held to apply, on the basis either that 
the use of force against an individual should be construed as an assertion of jurisdiction by the 
UK, and/or that the drone operator situated in the UK should trigger jurisdiction as he or she is 
clearly under the control (and is within the territory) of the UK, article 2(2) ECHR permits 
killing in defence of others where absolutely necessary to protect life, which is one way of 
appraising the  UK government’s claim to self-defence  in this case, although it presented no 
evidence that the lives of specific individuals in the UK or elsewhere were under imminent 
threat of existential attack. 
 
iii. In international law 
States have a right to self-defence that pre-dates the UN Charter. In the Nicaragua case the 
International Court established that the right to self-defence was an ‘inherent’ right under 
customary international law that was ‘confirmed and influenced by’ the UN Charter.71 The 
articulation of self-defence as an international legal principle developed through the Caroline 
                                                          
68 Above n 2. 
69 DJ Harris and S Sivakumaran, Cases and Materials on International Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 
226 
70 Al Skeini and Others v United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) paras 130–142 
71 Nicaragua (n 63) 94 
19 
case in the nineteenth century. In that case, ‘self-defence was changed from a political excuse 
to a legal doctrine’.72  
 
The Caroline case was later referred to in the Nuremberg Trials where it was stated that, 
‘preventative action in foreign territory is justified only in case of “an instant and 
overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation”’.73 The trial also made it clear, when discussing Germany’s invasion of Norway, 
that the claim that an act was one of self-defence is subject to objective scrutiny.74 Thus, a 
state’s judgement of its own actions is not final.75 It is therefore appropriate that the actions of 
any state claiming self-defence, as a justification for a use of force be placed under proper 
scrutiny, especially in the current climate of broadening legal claims to a right of self-defence. 
 
During correspondence between the British Foreign Office and US Secretary of State discussing 
the Caroline incident the British laid out three arguments to justify its destruction of the steamer 
Caroline, the latter of these being self-defence. It was clear that this was not regarded as ‘strictly 
legal’,76 that the only criterion was sufficient provocation and that the British Law Officers 
regarded the action as being fully justified under ‘self-defence and self-preservation’77 as it was 
performed with the aim of guarding against future hostile activities.78 The British had launched 
a surprise midnight attack on the vessel and in his correspondence US Secretary of State 
Webster stated that the British carried the burden of demonstrating that threats or a warning 
would have been ‘impracticable, or … unavailing,’ that ‘day-light could not be waited for,’ and 
that seizing and detaining the vessel ‘would not have been enough’.79 The US Secretary of State 
also provided the fundamentals of self-defence, which were accepted by the British Foreign 
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Office and are now acknowledged as being part of customary international law. It is for the 
state claiming self-defence to demonstrate that there existed a ‘necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. Furthermore, the 
state must also evidence that it ‘did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified 
by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.’80 
Thus, the essential elements can be summarised as: i) necessity (or imminence); and ii) 
proportionality. 
 
i) Necessity: The right of self-defence ‘can be invoked only against a danger which is serious 
and actual or imminent’.81 Necessity is a fundamental principle of the doctrine of self-defence 
in both domestic and international law. The Caroline case made it clear that that the situation 
must be such that no practical alternative exists. The International Court of Justice held that 
necessity was a criterion for self-defence in the Nicaragua case,82 and also in its Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion.83 Additionally, the Chatham House Principles state that: 
 
…there should be no practical non-military alternative to the proposed course of action 
that would be likely to be effective in averting the threat or bringing an end to an attack.84 
 
In the strike against Reyaad Khan, it was revealed that the ‘preparations took place over a 
period of months after the intelligence agencies briefed ministers’,85 strongly indicating that 
this was a premeditated killing rather than an act forced upon the government as the only means 
of preventing an imminent attack. 
 
ii) Proportionality: According to a classic statement of self-defence by de Vitoria writing in the 
sixteenth century: ‘In war everything is lawful which the defence of the common weal requires… the 
end and aim of war is the defence and preservation of the State’86 as without the existence of the 
state, all international law and the international system would be redundant. However, in the 
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modern context the ‘defensive measure must be limited to what is necessary to avert the attack 
or bring it to an end’,87 and the measures taken must be reasonably limited to the necessity of 
protection and proportionate to the danger.88 From the Prime Minister’s speech, it appears that 
although Khan was allegedly planning the attacks from his safe-haven in Syria, the actual 
attacks would have emanated from within the UK. Thus, it would seem that the UK security 
forces would have had the opportunity to intervene within the UK in order to prevent the 
attacks. Additionally, depending upon the stage of the plans, it may be that the attacks could 
still occur, notwithstanding the death of Khan – especially if those working in concert with 
Khan remain at large. The Prime Minister gave no details regarding arrests of those with whom 
Khan was working and upon whom he was relying for the implementation of his plans. 
 
Applying these principles of necessity and proportionality to the present case: the killing of 
Reyaad Khan was ‘meticulously planned’ over a course of months, suggesting that the drone 
strike was not a reaction to an imminent threat. Furthermore, the events identified as potential 
targets had passed. Khan was not going to perform the attack himself and so his co-conspirators 
may have retained the capacity to continue with the plot despite his death. Thus, it is asserted 
that whatever nefarious plots Reyaad Khan may or may not have been involved in, they do not 
appear to have been such as to leave ‘no moment for deliberation’ and that the UK security 
services would have had the potential capability to prevent the attacks from occurring without 
the death of Khan.  
 
iv. Pre-emptive strikes 
The concept of anticipatory self-defence is not uncontroversial and is not accepted by the 
majority of states.89 It seems that it is generally prohibited in law, although there may be 
circumstances in which anticipatory self-defence is morally or politically justified.90 However, 
pre-emptively repelling an identified and imminent attack (however that is defined and 
recognising that the ‘battleground for this debate is the correct definition of imminence’91) is 
not the same as launching a preventative war, which would, in all likelihood, lack the necessary 
element of imminence as it would be aiming to prevent at attack from manifesting at all – 
unless the notion of imminence is stretched beyond common sense limits. Where the line is 
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drawn is crucial in determining whether or not a defensive act by a state was justified. In his 
evidence to the UK’s Joint Committee on Human Rights Michael Fallon MP made it clear that 
he did not consider the Caroline definition to be current and that it was not ‘possible to have a 
hard and fast rule about how you would define “imminent”’.92 This is a problematic proposition 
as a flexible approach to imminence would allow states to justify almost any use of force 
against a perceived enemy by claiming that an attack was imminent, notwithstanding the 
seeming reassurance of Mr Fallon’s assertion that he has ‘to be absolutely satisfied that there 
is simply no other way of preventing an attack that is imminent’.93 
 
According to the Chatham House principles: 
 
The requirements set out in the Caroline case must be met in relation to a threatened 
attack. A threatened attack must be ‘imminent’ and this requirement rules out any claim 
to use force to prevent a threat emerging. Force may be used in self-defence only when 
it is necessary to do so, and the force used must be proportionate.94 
 
The UN’s High Level Panel of 2004 opined that ‘a threatened state, according to long 
established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is 
imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate’.95 The UN Secretary 
General has also declared that imminent threats are also covered by the right to self-defence.96 
The UK holds the view that states have the right to pre-emptively strike against an imminent 
attack.97 
 
Thus, it seems that a pre-emptive strike can be acceptable when the defender perceives an 
attack is about to occur. It would be to go against natural instinct and would be ‘unrealistic in 
practice to suppose that self-defence must in all cases await an actual attack’.98 When 
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considering violence between individuals, the legitimacy of pre-emption is understandable as 
an individual faces possible extinction from an attack, especially one involving a weapon. A 
state does not face the same degree of threat in that it is hard to see how one individual can 
sufficiently threaten a state with extinction. However, to allow terrorist threats to materialise 
would potentially undermine the social contract between state and its citizens as the monopoly 
on force the state enjoys is quid pro quo for the security each citizen enjoys. This would only 
occur, however, if the level of terrorist force was allowed to be such as to have the ‘scale and 
effects’ spoken about in the Nicaragua case.99 Below that threshold, terrorist violence should 
be dealt with in a the same manner as the serious threat of violent crime arising within the UK 
from organised crime, drug-related crime, vigilantism, and other similar challenges to the state 
monopoly on force.  
 
D. An Additional Criterion 
In continuing his speech to the House, the Prime Minister appeared to add another criterion to 
the assessment of when the use of force in self-defence is legitimate: 
 
We took this action because there was no alternative. In this area, there is no Government 
we can work with; we have no military on the ground to detain those preparing plots; and 
there was nothing to suggest that Reyaad Khan would ever leave Syria or desist from his 
desire to murder us at home, so we had no way of preventing his planned attacks on our 
country without taking direct action.100 
 
The UK appears to be adding an additional criterion of ‘unable or unwilling’, on the part of the 
host state where the terrorists are found, to the assessment of when the use of self-defence is 
legitimate. This is a problematic additional criterion as it is not clear how that is to be assessed 
and who is qualified to make that determination.101 It is not clear where this criterion has come 
from in relation to self-defence and appears to be a mixing of different legal principles 
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(principally borrowing from international criminal law). Although it has gained traction in the 
literature,102 it has not been expressly accepted by states.103 
 
E. The United Kingdom’s Legal Basis for the Strike 
The Prime Minister continued by outlining the legal basis for the strike: 
 
With these issues of national security and with current prosecutions ongoing, the House 
will appreciate that there are limits on the details I can provide. However, let me set out for 
the House the legal basis for the action we took, the processes we followed and the 
implications of this action for our wider strategy in countering the threat from ISIL. First, 
I am clear that the action we took was entirely lawful. The Attorney General was consulted 
and was clear that there would be a clear legal basis for action in international law. We 
were exercising the UK’s inherent right to self-defence. There was clear evidence of these 
individuals planning and directing armed attacks against the UK. These were part of a series 
of actual and foiled attempts to attack the UK and our allies, and given the prevailing 
circumstances in Syria, the airstrike was the only feasible means of effectively disrupting 
the attacks that had been planned and directed. It was therefore necessary and proportionate 
for the individual self-defence of the United Kingdom. The United Nations Charter requires 
members to inform the President of the Security Council of activity conducted in self-
defence, and today the UK permanent representative will write to the President to do just 
that.104 
 
The Prime Minister went on to explain that this was not action undertaken as part of an armed 
conflict in Syria in which the UK was involved, something that did not happen until December 
2015 when the government won a vote in the House of Commons in favour of UK airstrikes in 
Syria.105 Despite this, however, the Prime Minister did allude to principles of humanitarian law 
- minimising civilian casualties, proportionality and military necessity. These are referenced as 
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also framing the conduct of the operation, but the overriding claim was that the government 
had no other choice but to use lethal force in defence of the UK.  
 
Our intelligence agencies identified the direct threat to the UK from this individual and 
informed me and other senior Ministers of that threat. At a meeting of the most senior 
members of the National Security Council, we agreed that should the right opportunity 
arise, military action should be taken. The Attorney General attended the meeting and 
confirmed that there was a legal basis for action. On that basis, the Defence Secretary 
authorised the operation. The strike was conducted according to specific military rules of 
engagement, which always comply with international law and the principles of 
proportionality and military necessity. The military assessed the target location and chose 
the optimum time to minimise the risk of civilian casualties. This was a very sensitive 
operation to prevent a very real threat to our country, and I have come to the House today 
to explain in detail what has happened and to answer questions about it. 
I want to be clear that the strike was not part of coalition military action against ISIL in 
Syria; it was a targeted strike to deal with a clear, credible and specific terrorist threat to 
our country at home. The position with regard to the wider conflict with ISIL in Syria has 
not changed. As the House knows, I believe there is a strong case for the UK taking part in 
airstrikes as part of the international coalition to target ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq, and I 
believe that that case only grows stronger with the growing number of terrorist plots being 
directed or inspired by ISIL’s core leadership in Raqqa. However, I have been absolutely 
clear that the Government will return to the House for a separate vote if we propose to join 
coalition strikes in Syria. 
My first duty as Prime Minister is to keep the British people safe. That is what I will always 
do. There was a terrorist directing murder on our streets and no other means to stop him. 
The Government do not for one minute take these decisions lightly, but I am not prepared 
to stand here in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on our streets and have to explain to the 
House why I did not take the chance to prevent it when I could have done. That is why I 
believe our approach is right. I commend this statement to the House.106 
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The government has declined to publish the Attorney-General’s advice and it is not exactly 
clear whether or not the advice was specific to the killing of Khan or was more in principle.107  
 
In response to a question from Harriet Harman MP, the Prime Minister stated: 
 
She asked: is this the first time in modern times that a British asset has been used to conduct 
a strike in a country where we are not involved in a war? The answer to that is yes. Of 
course, Britain has used remotely piloted aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan, but this is a new 
departure, and that is why I thought it was important to come to the House and explain why 
I think it is necessary and justified… If it is necessary to safeguard the United Kingdom 
and to act in self-defence, and there are no other ways of doing that, then yes, I would [do 
it again]’.108 
 
Debates about the extra-territorial application of human rights can tend to obscure the central 
problem with drone strikes taken outside of armed conflict, namely the claim that they are 
justified actions of self-defence of a state under the international law governing the use of force 
by states. Rather than this jus ad bellum standard, cases of threats posed by individual terrorists 
should be assessed at the level of the individual right to life, at least in principle, where lethal 
force is only permitted for state agents acting in self-defence when absolutely necessary to 
protect the lives of those using force or other individuals under attack or in danger of imminent 
attack. It is clear that the UK government is deliberately using a self-defence standard that does 
not recognise this divide on the basis that the average citizen will not recognise ‘fine’ legal 
distinctions. There is also a deliberate attempt by the UK government to mould the concept of 
self-defence to capture any state use of force against state, non-state actor or individual, who 
is presented as a threat to the nation, understood not only as the state but also every UK national. 
This is not justifiable under the concept of self-defence as ‘military action, even in national-
defense, remains morally problematic in a profound and troubling way’.109  What may be used 
to justify legitimate self-defence by an individual person, ‘fails to do so for national defense’.110 
The use of the self-defence argument is predicated on the notion that it is possible to determine 
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which actor has behaved illegitimately and in a manner that makes the use of force against 
them justifiable.111 
 
However, the interpretation of self-defence at both national levels and international levels is 
much disputed, creating the conditions for drone using states to exploit and operate what 
appears to be a new form of remote self-defence in the shape of drone strikes undertaken by 
operators thousands of miles away from the targets. Even within federal states, there are 
different understandings of what is allowed in self-defence.112 There are differences in criminal 
law standard between states, while at the international level self-defence means different things 
in different contexts. For example, in the case of peacekeeping, self-defence has been extended 
from a narrow conception of a peacekeeper defending himself and his colleagues from attack, 
to include defending third parties under imminent threat, to extend to defending the mandate 
and the peace process.113 In peacekeeping, self-defence straddles a national criminal 
law/human rights standard and what could be called a jus ad bellum standard of self-defence, 
when a state is defending itself from attack. Normally a peacekeeper is concerned with 
defending himself from attack and increasingly defending civilians under imminent existential 
threat, but occasionally, especially under mandates given to forces in the 21st century, he or 
she is concerned with defending the state in which they have been deployed. However, that 
expanded concept of self-defence of the state can only be justified under a Chapter VII mandate 
given to the peacekeeping force by the Security Council under which certain ‘necessary 
measures’ have been authorised. In any case, a peacekeeper acting in defence of a civilian 
under attack is to be judged by narrower and specific standards of imminence, proportionality 
and necessity, than when he or she is acting to defend the state from non-state actors who 
threaten the peace. Similarly, when a state authorises a drone operator to use lethal force against 
an individual target in defence of potential victims, as the UK did against Reyaad Khan, it 
should be judged by the narrower and specific standards of a state agent coming to the defence 
of threatened citizens in the UK, which focuses on when an individual’s life can be taken by a 
state that owes him a duty not to violate his right to life, unless a ‘use of force is no more than 
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is absolutely necessary ... in defence of any person from unlawful violence’,114 and not by 
standards applicable to self-defence of a state under Article 51 of the UN Charter and under 
customary international law. 
 
Doubts about sufficiency of the claim to self-defence made by the Prime Minister in relation 
to the lethal strike against Reyaad Khan, may explain why, in the letter to the Security Council 
explaining the defensive nature of the action, referred to by the Prime Minister, the British 
ambassador widened the threat to include ISIL: 
 
On 21 August 2015 armed forces of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland carried out a precision airstrike against an ISIL vehicle in which a target known 
to be actively engaged in planning and directing imminent armed attacks against the 
United Kingdom was travelling. This airstrike was a necessary and proportionate 
exercise of the individual right of self-defence of the United Kingdom.  
As reported in our letter of 25 November 2014, ISIL is engaged in an ongoing armed 
attack against Iraq, and therefore action against ISIL in Syria is lawful in the collective 
self-defence of Iraq.115 
 
The justification becomes an even broader jus ad bellum one, namely that Reyaad Khan’s 
killing was both an act of individual self-defence of the UK and an action in collective self-
defence of Iraq, and, moreover, was a strike against ISIL, an armed group that is more likely 
to be able to mount attacks of the scale and effects required to trigger the UK’s right of self-
defence of the state under Article 51 of the Charter. This effectively became the position of the 
UK following the terrorist attacks on Paris in November 2015, when Parliament voted for 
airstrikes against ISIL, after gaining a resolution in the Security Council that lent support to 
states using force against that organisation.116 It might be argued that this renders the debate 
about the killing of Reyaad Khan an academic one as ISIL and its members became a legitimate 
target after Paris, but that would leave the stand-alone killing of an individual by a drone strike 
as a precedent for when there for future terrorist scares and threats that are not overtaken by 
events. 
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Further obfuscation of the legal basis of the strike is found in evidence given on 16 December 
2015 to the Joint Committee on Human Rights Inquiry into UK government’s policy on the 
use of drones for targeted killings, when the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon 
MP, stated that: 
 
I think that compliance with international humanitarian law discharges any obligation 
that we have under international human rights law, if I can put it that way. If any of 
those obligations might be thought to apply, they are discharged by our general 
conformity with international humanitarian law.117  
 
Although by this time the UK’s use of force in Syria had been approved by the House of 
Commons (on 3 December 2015), the discussion focused on the drone strike of August 2015 
in which Reyaad Khan was killed. Furthermore, the above was an answer given to a specific 
question: ‘The human rights law standard says that lethal force outside an armed conflict 
situation is justified only if it is absolutely necessary to protect life. Is that the standard?’118 
The most relevant question was not answered; instead the government fell back on arguments 
of humanitarian law that only apply in an armed conflict to which the UK is a party. The 
introduction of in bello standards to displace the stricter human rights ones is yet another 
example of the government playing fast and loose with international law. 
 
V Conclusion 
There will be drone strikes in the future where there is no link to an armed conflict, where the 
standard against which the action should be measured is one of self-defence and then care must 
be taken to assess whether the claim can be founded under the UN Charter, essentially as a 
defence of state, or under human rights law, as a defence of individuals. Self-defence at both 
levels shares common features, such as imminence, that drone strikes like the one against 
Reyaad Khan, struggle to match, but killing individuals in defence of individuals is properly 
assessed at the more precise level of the right to life. The fact that human rights law has lagged 
behind the technology reality of drone strikes, by failing to recognise whether the use of lethal 
force against an individual by a state agent firing a weapon from a drone flying over another 
state is an assertion of jurisdiction over the target, should not detract from the conclusion that 
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the targeted killing of an individual is an act that should be judged by human rights standards. 
There are two exceptions to this: first, if the targeted individual can be said to be part of an 
imminent armed attack on the UK that has such scale and effects that it triggers the right of 
self-defence of the state itself under Article 51 of the Charter, when proportionate force can be 
used to eliminate the attack or imminent threat of it; secondly, where the UK is engaged in an 
on-going armed conflict against a non-state actor such as ISIL, and the individual is a legitimate 
target under the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law). It is submitted that 
Reyaad Khan’s killing did not fit either of the exceptions and, moreover, on the evidence 
presented by the Prime Minister, did not represent such an existential threat to individuals 
within the UK to justify the use of lethal force against him in violation of his right to life.   
 
New technology, whereby an operator, sitting thousands of miles away, can in real time and 
with great precision kill an individual, means that individual drone strikes outside of an armed 
conflict challenge our conceptions of when force is legally justifiable. The surgical killing of 
an individual by a drone operator who is not under imminent threat of existential violence or 
physically close to others who are under such a threat, does not seem to fit our definition of 
self-defence as either captured in criminal law or human rights law, but it is argued that it 
should be these standards that are applicable. Evidence of an existential imminent threat to 
individuals in the UK or to its citizens abroad must be given for such strikes to be justified. 
Claiming the right to defend the state by targeted killings of individuals cannot be accepted per 
se without evidence that the individual was part of an imminent orchestrated attack that is of 
sufficient scale as to elevate the attack to one against the state and not only against individuals 
within it. To blithely accept that the UK has the right to defend itself against Reyaad Khan is 
to grossly exaggerate the threat one individual can pose, but it also represents a reversion to a 
very primitive view of the state whereby its promise to protect its citizens at all costs is used to 
circumvent the basic rights of individuals. Moreover, the portrayal of individuals like Khan as 
dangerous and evil serves the purpose of justifying their demise. Precise and clinical summary 
execution of individuals suspected of terrorist activities in a country far away from the UK is 
technologically possible but it clearly violates human rights standards. It is time, however, that 
human rights laws caught up with technology. 
